Editor's Note: This paper was found in galley proof form from the journal Mind in the C.I. Lewis Archives in the Special Collections Department of the Stanford University Libraries, call number M174, Box 18, Folder 1. There are two copies of the proofs in this folder, one includes Lewis's corrections. The version that appears here incorporates all of Lewis's corrections. Where these corrections are substantive, the original wording is give in a footnote. The paperwas withdrawn from publication by Lewis early (...) in 1935. The proofs were found with Lewis's other papers in his house in Menlo Park after his death in 1964. (shrink)

I THE CONCEPT OF ACTION Among the most basic of legal concepts of concern to the practitioners of law at all levels we find those of defence, culpability, ...

We examine the process of the emission of light from an atom that is in a relative translational motion with respect to the medium at rest in which the electromagnetic excitations propagate. The effect of Lorentz contraction of the of electron orbits on the emitted frequency is incorporated in the Rydberg formula, as well as the emitter’s Doppler effect is acknowledged. The result is that the frequency of the emitted light is modified by a factor that is identical with what (...) is called the ‘relativistic Doppler effect’. The new emission formula is applied for reinterpretation of the Ives-Stilwell experiment and shown that within the second order of approximation with respect to the speeds of the atom and the ‘absolute speed’ (Earth’s speed relative to the medium), the absolute motion does not affect the interference. The expression for the modification of the frequency involves both a first and a second-order term with respect to the speed of the atoms in the cathode tube. The latter turns out to be quantitatively the same as if the time would have changed its rate in the frame moving with the atoms. Thus, a new interpretation of the results of this famous experiment is provided without stipulating time dilation. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does not face (...) the problem of multiple realizability. However, the 'trope solution' rests upon the assumption that one can combine a trope monism with a type dualism. I argue that such a combination cannot be allowed. Given a plausible interpretation of types within a trope ontology, trope monism in fact entails type monism. Consequently, if one identifies mental tropes with physical tropes, one must also identify mental and physical types and in doing so face a modified version of the multiple realizability argument. (shrink)

Karshish, the picker-up of learning's crumbs, The not-incurious in God's handiwork (This man's flesh He hath admirably made, Blown like a bubble, kneaded like a paste, To coop up and keep down on earth a space, That puff of vapour from His mouth, man's soul). Browning.

In this paper I argue that RadicalInterpretation (RI), taken to be a methodological doctrine regarding the conditions under which an interpretation of an utterance is both warranted and correct, has unacceptable implications for the conditions on (ascriptions of) understanding. The notion of understanding at play is that which underwrites the testimonial transmission of knowledge. After developing this notion I argue that, on the assumption of RI, hearers will fail to have such understanding in situations in which we should want to (...) maintain otherwise. The overall effect of the argument is to provide a heretofore unexamined source of motivation for anti-individualistic approaches to the semantics of utterances. (shrink)

Cytoplasmic protein-tyrosine kinases (PTKs) are enzymes involved in transducing a vast number of signals in metazoans. The importance of the Tec family of kinases was immediately recognized when, in 1993, mutations in the gene encoding Bruton's tyrosine kinase (Btk) were reported to cause the human disease X-linked agammaglobulinemia (XLA).(1,2) Since then, additional kinases belonging to this family have been isolated, and the availability of full genome sequences allows identification of all members in selected species enabling phylogenetic considerations. Tec kinases are (...) endowed with Pleckstrin homology (PH) and Tec homology (TH) domains and are involved in diverse biological processes related to the control of survival and differentiation fate. Membrane translocation resulting in the activation of Tec kinases with subsequent Ca2+ release seems to be a general feature. However, nuclear translocation may also be of importance. The purpose of this essay is to characterize members of the Tec family and discuss their involvement in signaling. The three-dimensional structure, expression pattern and evolutionary aspects will also be considered. BioEssays 23:436–446, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

The Bohr-Heisenberg scheme, which forms the basis of any current version of the standard or Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is shown to be internally inconsistent. Although the inconsistencies demonstrated here are directly relatable to Einstein's opinion that it is unsatisfactory to interpret physical theory solely in terms of the knowledge gained from experimental outcomes, it is nevertheless shown that Einstein's view requires important modification. The implications of the Bohr-Heisenberg schem's self-inconsistency are discussed in relation to Bell's theorem and Aspect's (...) experiments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S BUNDLES, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND KANT Even if we are inclined to view Hume's attempt to explain ascriptions of personal identity as an abysmal failure, we might still be sympathetic toward his proposal to replace the going substance theory of the nature of mind with his bundle account. Thus we might fault Hume for erecting an unachievably high standard for personal identity, or round on him for excluding bodily criteria (...) 2... from his solution, but nonetheless applaud his spiriting away of the Cartesian soul substance leaving his "true idea of the human mind" (261) as a collection of perceptions in its stead. However, Hume's concern to give an account of the idea of the unity of a human mind in terms of related perceptions has run into notoriously rough sledding, not the least of which is the fact that Hume himself in his Appendix to "Of Personal Identity" seems to abandon his bundle theory in despair. In this paper I shall first be concerned to examine the criticism of his bundle theory which Hume brings forth in the Appendix and explain why I think the core difficulty remains insoluble for Hume. I shall then go on to suggest that the unworkability of Húmete bundle theory is directly tied to his failure to appreciate certain features of the peculiarly first person nature of his question about the make-up of minds. In thus emphasizing the place of the first person voice in my interpretation I am stealing a leaf, if not a chapter, from Kant. But this is as it should be since one of the aims of this essay is to provide an interpretation of Hume's difficulties with his account of the nature of mind which explains part of the reason why 'self-consciousness' (or 'apperception') looms so very large in the Critique of Pure Reason attack upon Hume's type of bundle theory. 60. 1. Hume's Second Thoughts In a burst of self criticism at the Appendix to the section on personal identity, Hume brings forth this objection to his own efforts:...Having thus loosen' d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have indue' d me to receive it (635). After additional reflections Hume encapsulates his objection thus:...All my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness (6SS-6). What is the defect Hume calls to our attention? Notice first that the footnote on page 635 explicitly refers us back to that part of his account Hume considers defective; and when we look back to the text of the Treatise in question, page 260, we find it is precisely there that Hume uses the analogy of a republic to sketch his bundle theory of the unity of mind in terms of the two associative principles, resemblance and causation. So it must somehow be that this account in terms of the associative principles is mistaken. But what then is the mistake? According to Hume it is that he cannot 'explain' the principles which unite the discrete percepts. Now it seems to me there are only two possible things Hume could mean in saying this. He could mean either (1) that the principles which connect the percepts of one mind are instances of the associative principles, but he cannot explain them; or (2) there must be other, non-associative, principles which connect the percepts of a single mind and these he cannot explain. 61. I think we can safely conclude (1) cannot represent Hume's misgivings when he says he is unable to explain the uniting principles of the mental bundles. There is first the fact that he does not call into question his general programme of accounting for the nature of the unity of complex things by the principles of causation, resemblance and contiguity — for example, ships, plants, animals, houses and rivers (e.g. 257f) — but only his... (shrink)

A lucidly written and original contribution to the study of the concept of expression. "The aim has been to construct an analysis from the examination of typical forms of human expressions and from the logical implications of our description of such expressions." An interesting theory emerges from such an analysis in Chapters I and II. The theory is "extended to language in Chapter III and to art in Chapters IV and V." Chapter I deals with behavior and expression and plausibly (...) argues for the thesis that intentionality is characteristic of expressible states of the person and that these expressions are "noncontingently connected with behavioral patterns associated with them." Chapter II takes up the topic of inference. It begins with the distinction between "Ø-expression" and "expression of Ø." The former is claimed to be a "description of certain observable features of a situation;" and the latter is an "inference warranting expression, relating some intentional state of a person to particular aspects of his observable behavior." It is argued that the nature of warrantable inference is non-causal, but "one which moves from a part of a conceptual complex to another part, or to the whole of it." Chapter III contains a good discussion of the distinction between belief and opinion, expressive and performative uses of language. The chapter concludes with the statement that "linguistic expression, like its behavioral counterpart, preserves an inferential connection with intentional states of the person." The last two chapters deal with art as expression. The appendix contains quotations from prominent expression theorists. A useful bibliography is also provided.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This interesting and original essay deals with the sense in which the self is a problem, i.e. the sense in which the self poses a problem. The central thesis is carefully argued: "that if there is a problem of the self, its solution is that self is a problem." Central to the thesis is the distinction between persons and selves. The concept of a person is in Heideggerian terms "ontic" in the sense that it does not arise from any theoretical (...) concern. The concept of self is an "ontological" one. Chapter one argues for the assumption that "persons can be generally inconsistent" and for the distinction between computers and persons. In Chapter two, "the self" is defined as "the locus of the inconsistency." The remaining essays deal with the problems of identity, immortality, consciousness and the pivotal role of the self in philosophical controversy. The book is clearly written and its thesis is carefully supported by arguments. It is an original contribution to the philosophy of mind.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This work belongs to what Adam Smith called "the theory of moral sentiments," in particular, it is concerned with the operation of sympathetic affections, which are termed "vicarious affects"; and their rationality and legitimate role in moral theory. Professor Rescher forcefully argues for the thesis that the crucial aspect of vicarious affects lies in their function as motivational factor or reason rather than as a cause of personal conduct. A formal machinery is proposed for the quantitative aspect of the workings (...) of vicarious affects and applied to the problem of the "prisoner’s dilemma." In the latter connection, Rescher shows with insight that there is really nothing paradoxical about the "prisoner’s dilemma." The apparent paradox arises only because the game theorist failed to distinguish sharply rationality and prudence. "It is a travesty... to construe rationality in terms of prudential self-advantage, for there is nothing in any way inherently unreasonable or irrational about a concern for others." "There is no reason why ’self-interest’ should not be construed in an enlightened and widened sense to include the interests of others, through the operation of the vicarious affects." Rescher also points out that there are two alternatives, other than prudence, to the "solution" of conflict interaction situations, i.e., negotiation and impartial arbitration, when both are construed as tacit rather than explicit processes. One chapter is devoted to a fuller analysis and defense of the "impartial arbiter" approach as superior to the negotiation approach, and followed by a sustained critique of utilitarian doctrine of morality. Complex distinctions and arguments are set forth. The fatal weakness of utilitarianism, of various versions, is said to lie in its failure to distinguish de facto utilities and de jure utilities. De jure utilities have rational warrant "exterior to the utilitarian perspective." "An evaluative assessment of the means by which such legitimate human ends as welfare requires the background of a larger vision of the ends of man." The final chapter elaborates this vision as Hegelian in character. While the gap between morality and self-interest is recognized, Rescher postulates as a regulative ideal "a reciprocal coordination of personal and social advantage." But this larger vision includes welfare-transcending considerations, e.g., the various ideals of the quality of life, those "higher" aspirations. "Excellence, dignity, and the sense of worth are its leading themes." In the Primacy of Practice, one finds a fuller discussion of moral excellence, but on the whole Rescher has not offered us a detailed account of this ideal dimension of morality. For the present work, at any rate, Rescher has succeeded in arguing for the significant role of vicarious affects in moral philosophy and its implication for the legitimacy of differential treatments based on personal relationships. It is hoped that, in some future work, Professor Rescher will systematically integrate this role of vicarious affects in an ideal moral theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

This is perhaps the most original and important treatise on moral philosophy since the publication of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. It commands attention both in terms of its comprehensive scope and argumentative rigor in attempting to offer a theory of moral justification by way of establishing a supreme principle of morality through an analysis of the concept of action and the application of reason to action. The main thesis is "that every agent by the fact of engaging in action, is (...) logically committed to the acceptance of certain evaluative and deontic judgments and ultimately of a supreme moral principle, the Principle of Generic Consistency, which requires that he respect his recipients’ necessary conditions of action. To prove this thesis, I have argued that the very possibility of rational interpersonal action depends upon the adherence to the morality that is grounded in this principle." The book contains five lengthy chapters. The first three chapters set forth the theoretical phase of the work; the last two concern the direct and indirect applications of the Principle of Generic Consistency. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive investigation of the foundations of value theory. It is a survey of some two or three thousand appraisive concepts in the English language, partly "in order to show that ethics and value theory are but stunted growths if they try to confine their attention merely to the vocabulary of general or ultimate appraisives: good, bad, right, wrong". The book contains three parts. Part I deals with Procedures of Appraisal and Judgment, i.e., with the capacities of the (...) mind to respond or react appetitively or emotionally to the environment. Five topics are examined: enjoyment, response, appraisal, enactment, and moral involvement. (shrink)

This work attempts to develop a workable formal theory of coherence that avoids the objections traditionally advanced against the earliest versions of the theory. Basically it construes the coherence theory as a criterial rather than definitional approach to truth, i.e., as furnishing a criterion rather than a definition of truth. The problem of criterion is seen as a problem not of guaranteeing but of authorizing criterion. Coherence is a criterion applying to a set of propositions that satisfies the conditions of (...) consistency and connectiveness of the systemic sort. A detailed logical machinery is developed. The pivotal concept is the notion of data as a truth-candidate, "a proposition to be taken not as true, but as potentially or presumptively true.". (shrink)

Plutarch's essay de fortuna Romanorum has attracted divergent judgements. Ziegler dismissed it as ‘eine nicht weiter ernst zu nehmende rhetorische Stilübung’. By Flacelière it was hailed as ‘une ébauche de méditation sur le prodigieux destin de Rome’. It is time to consider the work afresh and to discover whether there is common ground between these two views. Rather than offering a general appreciation, my treatment will take the work chapter by chapter, considering points of interest as they arise. This method (...) will enable us to compare what Plutarch says on particular subjects and themes in de fort. Rom. with what he says or does not say about them elsewhere. We shall thus be able to see clearly that for the most part the ideas he presents in the essay correspond with his thoughts about the rôle of fortune expressed in more serious writing, and that, where there is no correspondence, this is attributable to the rhetorical background. I do not intend to address directly the frequently discussed but insoluble question of whether we have in de fort. Rom. only one of two original works, that is whether there was once a de virtute Romanorum which Plutarch composed or answered. De fort. Rom. itself in fact gives almost as much prominence to άρετή as to τúχη, and their competing roles will be carefully evaluated. Nor do I look at the dating of the work. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

The aim "has been to provide the general reader with a reliable and trustworthy account of the life, teaching and influence of Confucius and to show how a man, comparatively insignificant and obscure in his own day, came to occupy a supreme place as the Great and Revered Teacher of the Chinese people." This aim is admirably fulfilled in this sympathetic study of the roots and history of Confucian civilization and its continuing revival of interest, both in the mainland and (...) in areas of Chinese Dispersion, in Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Part I gives a good account of the "unique and distinctive place given to Confucius, the founder of one of the world’s greatest systems of religion and philosophical thought." A persuasive case is offered for the defense of the religious dimension of Confucian thought, though its content is essentially ethical. Professor Smith has, in the main, succeeded in conveying the Confucian religious attitude. Part II devotes to a discussion of Confucian civilization from the triumph of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty, and its role until the founding of the Republic of China in 1911. It deals with the development of Neo-Confucian systems and the state cult. A great emphasis is placed on the process that led to the apex of the Confucian civilization in the Manchu Dynasty. The book concludes with an assessment of Confucius: "The great ideals of individual perfection and a harmonious social order which Confucius inculcated are as relevant in the modern world as they were nearly 2500 years ago.... He retains his place, and will still retain his place among the wise ones of the earth who sought after righteousness and found it a thing of great price. Confucius is China’s greatest gift to mankind." The book is a contribution to contemporary reassessment of Confucian thought.—A. S. C. (shrink)

These volumes provide a large introduction to the works of modern value theory from their beginnings in J. Bentham, F. Nietzsche, and H. Lotze to the more recent Anglo-American studies. Volume I is concerned with "the German-Language Group." Extensive discussion is devoted to the views of F. Brentano, A. Meinong, C. von Ehrenfels, J. C. Kreibig, E. Heyde, H. Rickert, H. Münsterberg, M. Scheler, K. Wiederhold, W. Stern, F. Wilken, M. Beck, and V. Krafts. It provides a good conspectus of (...) varieties of nineteenth century value theories. The author aims at an exposition rather than critical treatment of the various philosophers. Each chapter contains a useful bibliography. Of more contemporary interest is Volume II which deals with the Anglo-American Group. One finds here a detailed presentation of the theories of W. M. Urban, J. Dewey, B. Bosanquet, D. Prall, C. G. Shaw, R. B. Perry, D. H. Parkel, W. Stern, A. C. Garnett, J. N. Findlay, E. Brightman, B. E. Jessup, C. I. Lewis, R. Lepley, S. C. Pepper, Everett Hall, R. Hartman, and W. D. Lamont. Shorter discussions deal with works of A. L. Hillard, E. M. Adams, and K. Aschenbrenner. Liberal quotations from original sources are interspersed throughout the exposition. The clarification of issues is not always successful. The author does provide a good focus, however, for important passages from the works discussed. Regrettably, one finds an omission of the view of David Pole, the absence of a summary section on each theory discussed, and the absence of an index. Nevertheless, the students of value theory can find in this work a useful tool of research. The comprehensive scope provides a rich variety of contributions to the important field of value theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

This book is an excellent collection of papers which partly spring from, and partly bear on the Study Group on the Unity of Knowledge held in various universities, October, 1967-March, 1970. The papers all bear on the problem of reduction. In "Unity of Physical Law and Levels of Description," Ilya Prigogine argues that organized structures need physical laws of organization, not of entropy only, to explain their genesis and operation." The editor’s paper, "Reducibility: Another Side Issue," argues, following Polanyi, that (...) living things as machines already transcend physics, since they demand both chemical and engineering principles for their explanation." "How is Mechanism Conceivable?" points out that ordinary ways of talking about and explaining behavior, i.e., as involving intention and purpose, differs in logic from mechanistic explanation. But this difference in logic of the two languages is "never an obstacle to the reduction of one theory to another, indeed, there is always such a noncongruence of the conceptual mesh." Anthony J. P. Kenny’s "The Homunculus Fallacy" argues against "the reckless application of human-being predicates to insufficiently human-like objects." In "Behavior, Belief, and Emotion," A. C. MacIntyre argues for the thesis that "there is no necessary connection between at least some emotions and particular forms of behavior." In "The Critique of Artificial Reason," H. Dreyfus criticizes both the empirical and a priori arguments for optimism underlying the work in artificial intelligence. It displays the underlying philosophical assumption inherent in Western philosophical tradition since Plato. The last two papers concern Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. In "Tacit Knowledge and the Concept of Mind," W. T. Scott shows how Ryle’s "Concept of Mind can be significantly extended by considering certain features of the philosophical position that Michael Polanyi has developed around the concept of tacit knowing." R. S. Cohen’s "Tacit, Social and Hopeful" discusses the difficulties in Polanyi’s epistemology and the merits of the logical reconstruction work in science. Only the papers by Dreyfus and Scott have been previously published. Throughout the collection, the editor has provided useful introductory remarks focusing upon the unifying themes in the collection.—A. S. C. (shrink)